Practically every corporation that is connected to the Internet uses firewalls as the first line of its cyber-defense. However, the protection that these firewalls provide is only as good as the policy they are configured to implement. The first quantitative evaluation of the quality of corporate firewall configurations appeared in 2004, based on Check Point FireWall-1 rule-sets. In general that survey indicated that corporate firewalls were often enforcing poorly written rule-sets, containing many errors. One important finding was that high rule-set complexity was positively correlated with the number of detected configuration errors. Another finding was an indication that rule-sets from later software versions had slightly fewer errors.
Introduction

Background
Firewalls are the cornerstones of corporate intranet security. Once a firewall is acquired, a firewall administrator has to configure and manage it to realize an appropriate security policy for the particular needs of the company. This is a crucial task; quoting [RGR97] : "The single most important factor of your firewall's security is how you configure it".
It is generally accepted among network security experts that corporate firewalls are poorly configured. Anecdotal evidence of this sentiment can be found in such mailing lists as the Firewall Wizards list [FWW08] . Furthermore, the poor state of firewall configuration can be observed, indirectly, by the success of worms and viruses like Blaster [CER03] and Saphire [MPS + 03], which could have been easily blocked by a well configured firewall. This state of affairs was validated in a 2004 study [Woo04a] , which for the first time provided a quantitative evaluation of the quality of corporate firewall configurations collected in 2001.
However, firewall vendors regularly release new software versions for their products. In addition, the attention that is paid to firewall rule-set quality has increased, due to regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley act [SOX02] and the CobiT framework [Cob08] ; the Payment-Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [PCI06] ; and the NIST standard 800-41 [NIS02] . All these relatively new regulations include specific sections dealing with firewall configuration, management, and audit. Thus, one may hypothesize, or hope, that the quality of corporate firewall configurations has improved over time. The goal of this work is to test this hypothesis, and to check whether the findings of [Woo04a] are still valid.
Contributions
The data for the [Woo04a] study was collected in 2001, and clearly much has happened in the network security arena in later years. Therefore, one may challenge the validity of [Woo04a] claiming (or hoping) that the situation has improved over time. Moreover, [Woo04a] was fairly small in scope, covering only 37 rule-sets, all from Check Point firewalls, and considering only 12 possible errors, 8 of which were specific to Check Point FireWall-1. One could argue that the sample in [Woo04a] was not indicative, and that the detected problems were specific only to that vendor.
To address these possible critiques, the current study has the following features: (1) It is based on newer configuration data, collected from firewalls running later firewall versions; (2) It is significantly larger, covering more than twice as many rule-sets as [Woo04a] ; (3) For the first time, this study includes rule-sets from two leading firewall vendors: Check Point FireWall-1 (cf. [Wel02] ) and Cisco PIX (cf. [CF01] ); and (4) this study considers three times as many configuration errors, consisting of 36 vendor-neutral items instead of the 12 used in [Woo04a] .
The rule-sets were obtained from a variety of corporations that used the AlgoSec Firewall Analyzer between [2003] [2004] [2005] [MWZ05, Alg09] . Note that corporate firewall rule-sets are considered to be highly sensitive, and were provided under non-disclosure agreements that limit or delay our ability to discuss them publicly. Hence, publishing quantified statistics about these rule-sets may be viewed a contribution in itself.
An important contribution of this work is the identification and selection of the 36 vendor-neutral firewall configuration errors to search for. In principle, errors should be defined in terms of each corporation's network security policy. However, our stance is that of an external auditor, and we do not really know these policies. Therefore, the selected errors are all clear violations of well established practices and guidelines (cf. [SAN07] , [PCI06] , [NIS02] ).
The study's first finding is that serious errors are still alarmingly frequent: For instance, the infamous Microsoft services, that are a vector to numerous Internet worms (cf. [CER03]), are allowed to enter organiztions' networks from the outside in 42% of the surveyed firewalls. The most frequent error (allowing outbound SMTP from over 256 IP addresses 1 ) occured in over 80% of the surveyed firewalls. Moreover, since we only consider violations of "best practices" and do not attempt to understand each network's semantics, the findings should be viewed as a rough baseline: the protection offered by the firewalls we surveyed may well be worse than suggested by this work.
One of the findings of [Woo04a] was that Check Point firewalls with versions 4.1 or later had slightly fewer configuration errors than those with earlier software versions. In contrast, the current study does not show this effect-neither for Check Point firewalls nor for Cisco PIX firewalls. The data shows that the distribution of the number of configuration errors is essentially independent of the firewall software version.
Probably the most important finding of [Woo04a] was that rule-set complexity was positively correlated with the number of detected errors-and for this purpose [Woo04a] defined a rule-set complexity measure denoted by RC. Unfortunately, the RC measure is not suitable for Cisco PIX firewalls. Therefore, in order to compare the complexity of configurations by two different vendors, this work introduces a novel complexity measure, called the firewall complexity (FC) , that applies to both types of firewalls, and should be suitable to other firewall vendors' configuration languages as well. A key feature of the FC measure is that it produces comparable values between Check Point FireWall-1 and Cisco PIX. Furthermore, the FC values are comparable to the older RC values on Check Point FireWall-1.
What we shall see is that a rule-set's complexity, as measured by the new FC measure, is (still) positively correlated with the number of detected configuration errors. These findings hold for rule-sets from both vendors. Thus we validate and strengthen the finding of [Woo04a] , that, for well-configured firewalls, "small is (still) beautiful".
The study also allows a preliminary investigation on whether the choice of vendor had an impact on the quality of the configuration. One finding is that Check Point FireWall-1 configurations tend to be more complex than Cisco PIX firewalls. Another finding is that in general Cisco PIX firewalls have somewhat fewer errors than Check Point firewalls of comparable FC complexity. However, the larger Cisco PIX firewalls are essentially as poorly configured as the worst Check Point firewalls.
Organization:
The next section describes the data collection, provides some basic statistics of the data, indicates some caveats in the methodology, and describes the new FC measure. Section 3 describes the selection criteria for the configuration errors used in this study. Section 4 analyzes the data, describes the detected error frequencies, discusses the effects of the firewall's software version and rule-set complexity, and also compares the relative complexity and number of errors between the two vendors. We conclude in Section 5. Appendix A includes the full list of possible configuration errors that were used.
Methodology
Check Point firewalls
The data for this work includes 54 Check Point FireWall-1 rule-sets that were collected between 2003-2005. The rule-sets came from a variety of organizations, from the telecommunications, financial, energy, media, automotive, and healthcare market segments. Some basic statistics of the rule-sets are shown in Table 1 .
The collected rule-sets came from three Check Point major software releases: 4.0, 4.1, and NG, with the NG rule-sets spanning several minor releases. For this study I grouped all NG rule-sets up to fieldservers; Letting so many machines send e-mail directly, bypassing the corporate mail server, indicates that the corporation is not properly controlling its outbound e-mail. Table 2 for a distribution of versions. The firewall version is relevant to our discussion since [Woo04a] reported that rule-sets collected from later Check Point FireWall-1 versions tended to have fewer configuration errors-see Section 4.3 for a discussion.
Cisco PIX firewalls
The data for this work also includes 30 Cisco PIX rule-sets that were collected between 2003-2005. Some basic statistics of the rule-sets are shown in Table 3 . The collected rule-sets include files from Cisco PIX versions 4.4-7.0. Since there were very few rule-sets from version 7.0 I grouped the rule-sets into four categories: 4.4, 5.0-5.2, 6.0-6.2, and 6.3-7.0. Table 4 shows the distribution of rule-sets into versions. See Section 4.3 for a discussion.
Caveats
When we consider the significance of the findings, we have to bear in mind several caveats.
The current study includes a total of 84 rule-sets. This is more than double the sample of [Woo04a] , but still a very small sample-The number of operational firewalls in the world is estimated to be hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, these rule-sets were not selected randomly: they were provided by organizations that wanted to perform an audit of their firewall rule-set, and were willing to purchase software for this purpose. Ancdotal evidence suggests that, in some cases, these organizations felt their firewall rule-sets were too complex to manage effectively without better software systems. Therefore, our sample may be biased toward complex, badly configured, firewalls.
In defense, I claim that the arguments of [Woo04a] Finally, obtaining and reporting on any number of real rule-sets from operational firewalls is extremely rare: These are considered to be highly sensitive files. So there is significant value in analyzing the data that can be obtained.
A New Measure of Firewall Complexity
One of the discoveries of [Woo04a] was that more complex rule-sets have more errors in them. To make such statements precise, in [Woo04a] I introduced a measure of complexity defined as
where #Rules is the raw number of rules in the rule-set, #Objects is the number of network objects, and #Interfaces is the number of interfaces on the firewall. I believe that the RC measure was quite successful in capturing the essence of rule-set complexity. However, for this study I realized that I needed to improve upon it, for two reasons. First, I found that RC was not suitable for Cisco PIX firewalls, and second, I found that RC didn't discriminate between more and less complex rule-sets as well as I initially hoped.
A comparable measure
In order to compare the complexities of Cisco PIX firewalls to those of Check Point firewalls I needed a measure that produced comparable values for the two vendors. However, I realized that RC cannot be applied to Cisco PIX, since Cisco PIX and Check Point FireWall-1 are configured differently (see [Woo04b] for details). For the purpose of measuring complexity, the most important differences are:
1. A Cisco PIX configuration includes a separate set of rules (called an access-list) for each interface, whereas a Check Point FireWall-1 has a single set of rules that applies to all the interfacesmaking #Rules incomparable.
2. Cisco PIX configurations do not have a separate object database, and up to version 6.0, Cisco PIX configurations did not even allow the definition of non-trivial objects, such as objects containing anything other than a single subnet. Thus #Objects is ill-defined for Cisco PIX firewalls.
More interfaces imply higher complexity
Beyond the immediate need for a measure that is suitable for Cisco PIX firewalls, I realized that RC could be improved upon for Check Point firewalls as well. Specifically, I felt that RC didn't give enough weight to the number of interfaces: as Table 1 shows, none of the surveyed Check Point firewalls has more than 18 interfaces (the median number was 4), yet it is not uncommon to find Check Point firewalls with hundreds of rules and thousands of objects. Since #Interfaces is only added to the RC, albeit quadratically, its contribution is often dwarfed by the two other terms. For instance, I felt that a firewall with 12 interfaces is much more complex than one with 3 interfaces with the same numbers of rules and objects-and this intuition is not well captured by the old RC measure since the growth in the number of interfaces only contributes an extra (66 − 3) = 63 points to the RC of the more complex firewall.
The new FC measure
For all these reasons I decided to design a new measure of complexity. To differentiate the new measure from the old I call the new measure the firewall complexity, denoted FC. Of course, this new measure still had to be objective, intuitive, and simple to compute.
For Cisco PIX firewalls, the simplest measure of complexity, and one which is often used in discussions with Cisco PIX administrators, is the number of lines in the configuration file. This was my first attempt to pick a new measure of complexity. However, I found the raw number of lines to be slightly misleading, especially for very small configurations. This is because even the smallest Cisco PIX configuration file includes a few tens of "boilerplate" lines that have little to do with traffic filtering. To compensate for this, I chose to use the following definition.
Definition 2.1 Let #Lines denote the number of lines in the ASCII file containing the complete Cisco PIX configuration file. Then the firewall complexity of a Cisco PIX firewall is:
To define a comparable measure for Check Point firewalls, I tried to capture the results of an imaginary over-simplified "Check Point-to-PIX converter". Such a convertor would need to replicate the single Check Point FireWall-1 rule-set and place a copy on each Cisco PIX interface. Therefore, for the FC measure I chose to multiply the number of rules by the number of interfaces. However, object definitions in (newer versions of) Cisco PIX are global (not per-interface), so FC only needs to add add the number of Check Point FireWall-1 objects, once. These choices have the nice side-effect of giving much more weight to the number of interfaces than the old RC did, thereby addressing a shortcoming of the RC measure. Thus, we arrive at the following definition.
Definition 2.2 Let #Rules denote the raw number of rules in the Check Point FireWall-1 rule-set, let #Ob-jects denote the number of network objects, and let #Interfaces denote the number of interfaces on the firewall. Then the firewall complexity of a Check Point FireWall-1 firewall is:
FC c = (#Rules × #Interfaces) + #Objects Figure 1 shows the distribution of the rule-set complexity as measured by FC over the surveyed Check Point FireWall-1 and Cisco PIX firewalls. While the precise value assigned by the new FC to a Check Point FireWall-1 rule-set differs from the value computed by the old RC for the same rule-set, the figure shows that the genaral range of values remains the same: 10-10,000. But more importatly, the FC values assigned to Cisco PIX rule-sets fall into the same range as well.
The figure also shows that Check Point FireWall-1 firewalls typically have a higher complexity: the median FC value for Check Point firewalls is 1117 versus 315 for Cisco PIX (note that the Y-axis is logscaled). My interpretation is that this is a real finding rather than an artifact of the FC metric: From inspecting the configuration data directly, it seems to me that indeed Check Point FireWall-1 configurations tend to be more complex.
The Selection of Configuration Errors
Selection Goals and Criteria
In [Woo04a] I considered twelve configuration errors. However, eight of those errors were specific to Check Point firewalls, which makes them unsuitable in a multi-vendor study. Therefore, in this study I used a different list of errors. The current list is much larger list, consisting of 36 errors. All the errors are vendorneutral and create a risk to the network behind the firewall. The full list of errors appears in Appendix A.
As in [Woo04a] , I took the stance of an external auditor. Thus, the errors I counted are all violations of well established practices and guidelines (cf. [SAN07] , [PCI06] , [NIS02] ), that are independent of each organization's specific requirements and policies. As such, the findings should be viewed as a rough baseline: The protection offered by the surveyed firewalls may well be worse than suggested by this work.
Note that a single badly written rule may trigger multiple counted errors, since some errors contain other, more specific, errors. For instance, allowing Telnet (TCP on port 23) is a special case of allowing "All TCP ports", which in turn is a special case of allowing "Any service". To avoid inflating the error counts because of this containment phenomenon, a more specific error was only counted if it was triggered by some rule that does not trigger a more general error. Continuing the previous example, a rule-set can trigger both the "Any service" and the "All TCP" errors -but only if the configuration includes two separate rules, one allowing Any service, and the other allowing all TCP ports.
One may argue that not all the configuration errors in the list are equally severe: For instance, some services have a poorer security history than others; also having all 65536 TCP ports open is probably more risky than having just the Telnet port open. However, in order to arrive at a single, easy to understand, number, I did not take such fine-grain considerations into account. The simplicity of counting each error type once allowed me to avoid introducing severity levels, and let me side-step the question "How many medium risk errors is one high risk error worth?".
Furthermore, one may argue that a configuration with ten rules allowing Any service is riskier than a configuration with just one such rule. My opinion is that the number of erroneous rules is a good measure for the level of effort that the firewall administator would need to spend fixing the configuration, but less indicative of the amount of risk: If an attacker can enter the network, then the network is at risk-and it is less important if the attacker has one or ten firewall rules that allow him in. Therefore, again in the interest of simplicity, I ignored the number of rules contributing to each error, and opted for Boolean indicators for each error.
Error Categories
The counted configuration errors (refer to Appendix A) are organized into four categories: inbound traffic, outbound traffic, internal traffic, and inherently risky rules. The errors in each category have an identifying code with a leading letter indicating the category: "i" errors for inbound traffic, "o" errors for outbound traffic, "d" errors for internal, and "r" errors for risky rules.
The majority of configuration errors (21 of the 36) are for inbound traffic ("i" errors). This is in line with the firewall's perceived primary job, which is to protect the internal resources from outsider attach. These errors cover things such as allowing Any traffic inbound, or allowing services such as NetBIOS, Telnet, RPC, SNMP, and several other known-risky services, through the firewall in the inbound direction.
I also wanted to count errors that are related to services such as HTTP, DNS, and FTP. These are services that are often necessary to the running of business, so allowing then inbound should not be counted as an error per se. For instance, HTTP must be allowed to reach the organization's web servers. However, allowing HTTP to reach machines that are not hardened web servers is risky-many sensitive machines (like e-mail servers, phone switches, routers, and firewalls) provide a web interface.
The challenge is that we do not necessarily know which IP addresses belong to the relevant servers and which do not. To get around this challenge, I chose to use thresholds. The key idea is that it is very rare to find hundreds of different web servers on one network. Thus, if HTTP is allowed to reach over 256 IP addresses-more than a full class-C subnet-this is almost always the result of badly written rules. Several of the inbound traffic configuration errors include such thresholds.
Configuration errors for outbound traffic ("o" errors) contribute 9 of the 36 items. Most of these deal with services that are considered to be risky in all directions. In addition I counted errors for indiscriminate outbound e-mail traffic (again using the notion of a thresholds) and for IRC, which is notorious for carrying the command-and-control channel of "bot-nets".
Internal traffic through the firewall (between separate internal network segments) contributes 5 of the 36 items ("d" errors): these all deal with services that are considered to be risky in all directions. Finally, I also counted a special "r" error for the presence of rules that are inheretly problematic: An error is counted if the rule-set has "To Any allow Any service" rules. Figure 2 shows the raw distribution of configuration errors that were discovered in the data. The results are perhaps unsurprising in view of [Woo04a] : Generally speaking, the surveyed firewalls are poorly configured.
Analysis and Discussion
Firewalls are still badly configured
In the inbound direction, over 45% of the firewalls allowed DNS, or FTP, or SMTP, to reach over 256 addresses (items i10, i11, and i09 respectively). Possibly more worrisome is that 42% of firewalls allowed inbound NetBIOS traffic (item i07).
In the outbound direction the situation is apparently worse. Over 80% of firewalls allow broad outbound SMTP access (item o02)-and over 60% of firewalls allow outbound P2P (o08), services which hardly ever have any business use. Finally, over 60% of firewalls have rules of the form "from somwhere to Any allow Any service" (r01): very lax rules, which constitute gross mistakes by any account. 
Complexity Matters: Small is Still Beautiful
One of the main findings of [Woo04a] was that high rule-set complexity was positively correlated with the number of detected configuration errors. Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the number of errors versus FC, and demonstates the same phenomenon in the current survey. We can observe that there are very few high-complexity rule-sets that are well-configured (the lower-right quadrant of the figure is very sparse). Furthermore, the figure clearly shows a correlation between the rule-set complexity, as measured by FC, and the number of detected errors.
In fact, the FC measure gives us a crude but fairly accurate prediction of the number of configuration errors: a linear regression (the central line on Figure 3) shows that the number of errors in a rule-set of complexity FC is roughly captured by the following formula: #Errors ≈ 8 log 10 (FC) − 10.
We can see that the current survey validates the finding of [Woo04a] : it's safer to limit the complexity of a firewall rule-set. Instead of connecting yet another subnet to the main firewall, and adding more rules and more objects, it seems preferable to install a new, dedicated, firewall to protect only that new subnet. Complex firewall rule-sets are apparently too complex for their administrators to manage effectively.
As an aside, note that both Check Point and Cisco (and indeed other major firewall vendors) are now offering virtualized solutions, in which a single piece of hardware can be set up to function as multiple separate firewalls. Besides offering various operational and commercial advantages, our results suggest that using multiple small (virtual) firewalls is likely to be more secure than a single large firewall. 
Does the Firewall's Version Matter?
One of the findings of [Woo04a] was that Check Point firewalls with versions 4.1 or later had slightly fewer configuration errors than those with earlier software versions. I wanted to test whether the same trend can be observed in this study as well.
Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of errors across the different versions, separately for Check Point FireWall-1 and Cisco PIX. It is clear from both figures that, contrary to the findings of [Woo04a] , the effect of the software version on the number of configuration errors is insignificant: the distribution of the number of errors is essentially independent of the firewall software version. The data does not support the hypothesis that later software versions are correlated with fewer errors (for both vendors). I believe that [Woo04a] detected such a trend because 8 of the configuration errors it considered were controlled by global options in the Check Point FireWall-1 user interface (rather than by explicit userdefined rules). The default settings for those gloal options were improved in v4.1, producing the detected effect. However, all the configuration errors considered in this study are vendor-neutral and are controlled by explicit user-defined rules: i.e., by the basic filtering functionality of the firewalls. This functionality has not changed syntactically or semantically, in neither vendor's products, during the period that data was collected. Therefore we see that later software versions do not help users write better filtering rules.
Does the Vendor Matter?
Given the fact that the data includes rule-sets from two vendors, with rather different configuration languages and tools, I wanted to investigate whether the choice of vendor had an impact on the quality of the We already saw in Figure 1 that Check Point FireWall-1 configurations tended to be more complex than Cisco PIX firewalls-and from Figure 3 we learned that more complex configurations typically have more errors. Hence, we can expect Check Point firewalls to have more errors than Cisco PIX firewalls just because of their greater complexity. To test the extent of this phenomenon, Figure 6 repeats the data of Figure 3 but with separate markers and regression lines for the two vendors.
As expected, the figure shows that in general Cisco PIX firewalls seem to exhibit fewer errors than Check Point firewalls: the median number of errors for the Cisco PIX firewalls is 6 versus 14 for Check Point firewalls. Furthermore, the vertical distance between the least-squares regression lines indicates that Cisco PIX firewalls have approximately 5 errors less than Check Point firewalls of comparable FC complexity. But a closer look reveals that small Cisco PIX firewalls, with FC < 1000, indeed have significantly fewer errors than small Check Point firewalls. However, the larger Cisco PIX firewalls, with FC ≥ 1000, are essentially as poorly configured as the worst Check Point firewalls. Note that this latter observation needs to be validated with more data: the surveyed firewalls only include 5 Cisco PIX firewalls with FC ≥ 1000.
As background for a possible explanation, other sources of information indicate that the Cisco PIX configuration language and operational environment is more difficult to learn and use than Check Point FireWall-1: E.g., Cisco PIX involves a complex notion of "direction" (cf. [Woo04b] ); Cisco PIX mandates the use of network address translation 2 (NAT) statements-even in the case that no translation is needed; Finally, many Cisco PIX firewalls are managed from the command line whereas Check Point firewalls are managed using a graphical user interface. As a result, one often sees questions on how to confiure the basic functionality of a Cisco PIX on mailing lists such as Firewall-Wizards [FWW08]. With this background, my interpretation of Figure 6 is that, perhaps paradoxically, the steeper learning curve and harsher work environment of a Cisco PIX encourage administrators to produce smaller configurations-that are less error-prone than comparable Check Point firewalls. However, once the Cisco PIX configuration complexity becomes large-the number of errors seems similar to the numbers in comparable (complex) Check Point firewalls.
Conclusions
As we've seen, this work follows the methodology of [Woo04a] . The current study is much larger, and is based on newer data, collected from firewalls made by two major vendors, running later firewall versions. Finally, the study considers three times as many possible vendor-neutral configuration errors. In order to compare the complexity of configurations from different vendors, this work also introduced a new uniform firewall complexity (FC) measure, that applies to both firewalls brands and probably to others as well.
Unlike [Woo04a] , the current study shows no significant indication that later software versions have fewer errors (for either vendor)-it seems that later software versions do not assist the administrators to make fewer errors.
However, the findings do validate the main observations of [Woo04a] : (a) firewalls are (still) poorly configured, and (b) a rule-set's complexity is (still) positively correlated with the number of detected configuration errors. These findings hold for rule-sets from both vendors. Thus we can conclude that, for well-configured firewalls, "small is (still) beautiful". i02: Inbound TCP on all ports Allowing TCP on all ports inbound is almost as risky as allowing Any service, since this includes many vulnerable TCP services. On PIX firewalls, this risk is often the result of neglecting to specify a port number on an access-list or conduit statement: omitting the port number is interpreted as "all ports".
i03: Inbound UDP on all ports Similar to allowing all TCP ports but for UDP.
i04: Inbound Telnet
Telnet is a remote-login service that is not encrypted. It is only authenticated by simple passwords, that are transmitted in the clear. Anyone snooping the traffic can read all the transmitted information.
i05: Inbound RPC The RPC service is a mechanism for remote procedure calls in Unix environments. It is implemented using the portmapper daemon, which assigns TCP ports to the services. RPC services have a long history of being insecure, and among others they include NFS (which potentially exposes all the organization's file system).
i06: Inbound SNMP SNMP is the Simple Network Management Protocol, which allows scanning and identifying the network infrastructure. It is only authenticated by a simple password, called the "community string". The community string is often left at its default setting of "public", and transmitted in the clear. Several serious vulnerabilities have been reported in SNMP.
i07: Inbound Microsoft services
NetBIOS is the name of a set of services that are used by the Microsoft Windows family of operating systems to support network functions such as file and printer sharing. These services are very insecure, and include some of the most attacked services [SAN07] . I counted an error if the firewall allowed any of these services to cross it.
i08: Inbound HTTP to 256+ IPs HTTP is the main protocol used for web browsing, so allowing it inbound is not counted as an error per se. However, allowing HTTP reach machines that are not hardened web servers is risky: Many sensitive machines provide a web interface: These include e-mail servers, printers, phone switches, routers, and firewalls. Therefore allowing HTTP to reach over 256 IP addresses is counted as an error because it is very rare to find so many web servers on one network-such access is almost always the result of badly written rules.
i09: Inbound SMTP to 256+ IPs SMTP is the main E-mail protocol-and E-mail is a vector for many viruses and worms. Nevertheless, allowing SMTP inbound is a requirement for many organizations, so inbound SMTP is not counted as an error. However, it is very rare to find more than 256 mail servers on one network, so allowing SMTP to reach over 256 IP addresses is counted as an error.
i10: Inbound DNS/UDP to 256+ IPs DNS is the Domain Name Service on UDP port 53 or on TCP port 53. DNS is one of the most attacked services in use [SAN07] . As before, inbound DNS is often required-so it's not counted as a risk-but allowing DNS to reach over 256 DNS servers on one network is. i16: Inbound DNS/TCP to 256+ IPs This is the same as item i10 except over TCP.
i17: Inbound MSSQL The Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL) contains several serious vulnerabilities that allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information, alter database content, compromise SQL servers, and, in some configurations, compromise server hosts. It's in the SANS Top 20 list [SAN07] .
i18: Inbound P2P Peer-to-peer services (napster, edonkey, gnutella, kazaa) are used to download, and distribute many types of data (e.g., music, video, graphics, text, source code, and proprietary information to name a few). These services are in the SANS Top 20 list [SAN07] . 
A.2 Errors Related to Outbound Traffic
For outbound traffic I counted three specific services that are particularly problematic in the outbound direction (o01, o02, and o03), plus six errors that are similar to inbound errors, as follows:
o01: Outbound POP3 POP3 is used to download E-mail from mail servers to desktop computers. Since E-mail is a vector for viruses and worms, many organization only allow POP3 to reach their internal E-mail servers, and forbid any access to external E-mail servers. An error is counted if POP3 is allowed outbound. 
A.3 Errors Related to Internal Traffic
For traffic between different internal network segments that are separated by the firewall the errors are a small subset of the inbound errors, as follows: 
A.4 Inherently Risky Rules
In addition to all the traffic-based errors described above, I also counted a special error for rules that are inheretly problematic, even if there are some other rules that mitigate some of their bad effects. An error is counted (with code r01) if the rule-set has "To Any allow Any service" rules.
